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This summary document provides an overview of the key findings and conclusions from 
Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime: The Facilitation of Money Laundering and its Control, 
published by Routledge in April 2020. Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime examines the role 
played by legal professionals in the facilitation of money laundering and considers how this is 
(and should be) dealt with through criminal justice and regulatory processes.    
 
The book analyses: 
 
• The legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks aimed at preventing lawyers and other ‘gatekeepers’ 
from allowing ‘dirty’ money into the legitimate financial system, including their scope, challenges and 
implications. 
 
• The diversity in the ways that lawyers can become involved in facilitating money laundering by or on 
behalf of their clients, and in the actions (or non-action) for which they can be convicted of money 
laundering offences. 
 
• The structures, processes and transactions of the legal profession that can provide 
opportunities/vulnerabilities for money laundering. 
 
• The role of decision-making by lawyers in relation to clients, transactions and services, and the various 
factors that may influence their decisions. 
 
• Concepts of complicity, knowledge, suspicion and intent in relation to lawyers’ involvement in money 
laundering and in relevant legislative frameworks. 
 
• The challenges and complexities of the current (criminal justice and/or regulatory) response to the 
facilitation of money laundering, and potential future strategies. 
 
Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime develops a framework and agenda for future research and 
analysis on the facilitation of money laundering by legal professionals. This remains an under-
researched area, and the framework provides clear direction for future analysis and empirical 
investigation. The book also proposes a combination of strategies for controlling the facilitation 
of money laundering, suggesting that multiple approaches are necessary due to the challenges 
and limitations of individual approaches. The findings from Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime 
will therefore be of interest to academics and researchers, AML/financial crime specialists, legal 
professional or representative bodies, regulators and AML supervisors, and policy makers 
responsible for preventing the facilitation of money laundering.
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What is ‘the facilitation of money laundering’? 
This term encompasses the various ways by which someone in a legitimate occupational 
position can play a role in how another person uses, moves or conceals the origins of the 
proceeds of crime.  
 
Section 328 of the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) states that a person commits an 
offence if they enter into or become concerned in an arrangement which they know or suspect 
facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by 
or on behalf of another person. Official discourse refers to the role of professionals in, for 
example: assisting organised crime groups to invest in property or high-value goods or to set up 
front businesses; integrating illicit funds into global banking systems; or concealing the proceeds 
of corruption or income on which no tax has been paid behind corporate structures and in off-
shore jurisdictions. Poor compliance with Money Laundering Regulations, or failure to 
adequately carry out the obligations they confer, may also be considered as facilitating money 
laundering.  
 
The research identified solicitors who had been convicted under s.328 or other offences 
(including the offence of failing to disclose suspicions of money laundering) for a whole range of 
different actions (or non-action). The analysis also showed variation in: the nature, purpose and 
complexity of the transactions or processes involved; the nature and form of the criminal 
proceeds; the relationship between the professional and the predicate offender; the benefit 
received by the professional for their role in the laundering; and the degree of complicity, 
knowledge and intent involved.  
 
The facilitation of money laundering, therefore, is not a homogenous phenomenon; it is 













The structures, processes and transactions of the legal profession and the nature of the 
organisations in which legal professionals work can provide opportunities for those wishing to 
assist others to launder criminal proceeds and make individuals within the profession 
vulnerable to exploitation for the purposes of laundering.  
 
Examples of these ‘opportunity/vulnerability structures’ include: 
 
• Client accounts 
A client account (or trust account) is a bank account maintained by a legal practice for 
holding client money, separate to the business account. These accounts are used, for 
example, to hold deposits in property transactions or facilitate other funds transfers. Whilst 
they provide a necessary legitimate function, client accounts can also be used to move illicit 
funds between individual/company bank accounts and in the purchase of assets, providing a 
‘façade of legitimacy’ to the transaction and obscuring the identity of the owner of the funds.  
 
• Property transactions and trust and company service provision 
Investment in high-value real estate can be used to hide, store or transfer the proceeds of 
corruption or other major crimes. On a lower scale, the purchase of residential property as a 
home, investment or rental opportunity is a common use for the proceeds of crime-for-profit. 
Corporate vehicles such as shell companies, trusts and foundations can be used as a means 
of confusing or disguising the links between offenders and the proceeds of their crimes. The 
legitimate role played by legal professionals in the conveyancing process of property 
transactions and in the setting up and management of corporate vehicles creates both 
opportunities and vulnerabilities for their involvement in money laundering. 
 
• Autonomy and lack of (internal) oversight  
Misconduct within organisations is more likely to take place at the less regulated, less visible 
or less transparent parts of routine business processes or transactions. A lack of internal 
oversight over transactions through client account, property conveyancing processes or trust 
and company service provision, for example, or high levels of autonomy for those carrying 
out such transactions, will increase their capacity to be misused. For example, a solicitor 
convicted for facilitating money laundering on behalf of a client was found to have had ‘sole 
operational control’ over his firm’s client account. Consideration should be given to methods 




• Nature of the organisation 
Organised crime groups looking to launder the proceeds of their crimes may be more likely to 
use small ‘high street’ legal practices and sole practitioners than larger firms, as they will be 
local, lower cost and lower risk. Larger firms operating on a transnational basis will provide 
the transactions and services used in more complex laundering processes. Sole practitioners 
have autonomy and lack of oversight, and will have fewer resources to keep up with anti-
money laundering regulations and guidance. Larger firms can invest in compliance 
programmes and may be more visible to regulatory agencies, but complex management and 
accountability structures can create opportunities for misconduct or regulatory non-
compliance. 
 
• New forms of law firm 
The legal services market in the UK has changed notably in recent years with, for example, 
the introduction of Alternative Business Structures (ABS), a growing online legal services 
provision and the rise of ‘freelance’ solicitors. As the 2017 UK National Risk Assessment of 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing suggests, innovation within the legal services 
market presents challenges for AML supervisors, as opportunities for accessing legal 
services without engaging a supervised firm are created. 
 
Solicitors interviewed during the research raised the issue of what they called ‘conveyancing 
farms’ or ‘conveyancing factories’ – firms that process large numbers of conveyancing 
transactions by using teams of paralegals rather than qualified solicitors. They considered 
such firms to be higher risk for money laundering.  
 
 
These and other opportunity/vulnerability structures are explored fully in Chapter 5. 
Understanding such structures allows the development of strategies to inhibit them – questions 
of motivation and intent become irrelevant; why professionals become involved in money 








On the ‘borders of knowingness’: complicity, knowledge and intent 
Undoubtedly, there are legal professionals who are fully complicit, active participants in 
money laundering, who know that they are facilitating transactions involving criminal proceeds 
and intend to do so. In some cases, there may be a complete lack of knowledge and intent, 
described by the FATF as ‘innocent involvement’, where no ‘red flags’ were apparent. However, 
in many cases involvement will exist on the ‘borders of knowingness’, without intent to 
facilitate laundering but with a degree of knowledge or suspicion about the client, their funds or 
the transactions or services requested. Chapters 6 and 7 explore the complexity of concepts of 
complicity, knowledge and intent in relation to the facilitation of money laundering, and how 
these can vary in different circumstances. This variation has implications for control strategies, 
highlighting the need for a combination of approaches (discussed below).   
 
Legislation used to prosecute the facilitation of money laundering in the UK allows for conviction 
without criminal intent or even, in certain circumstances, actual knowledge or suspicion that 
laundering was taking place. It therefore goes beyond the international frameworks from which it 
was derived, which focus on those who have intentionally laundered criminal proceeds. This has 
significant implications for those working in the legal profession, who face serious 
potential consequences for failing to fulfil their ‘gatekeeper’ obligations.  
 
 
Decision-making in context 
The facilitation of money laundering by legal professionals involves decision-making: there must 
be either a decision to facilitate money laundering or a decision to proceed with a certain 
transaction, provide a certain service or agree to act for a certain client, for example. The 
decision to facilitate money laundering refers to an active, knowing choice to assist the 
predicate offender in the laundering of their criminal proceeds. This may be motivated by 
(personal or organisational) financial benefit or competitive advantage, and involve taking 
advantage of opportunities created by the structural factors discussed above.  
 
But lawyers can become involved in the facilitation of money laundering without making an 
active choice to do so, through the everyday decisions they make as part of their routine 
occupational role. (This does not suggest a complete lack of knowledge/suspicion or 
‘wrongdoing’; it highlights the complexity of issues of knowledge and intent).  
 
These decisions are shaped by a range of macro-, meso- and micro-level factors, summarised 
in figure 9.1. For example, the regulatory environment in a particular jurisdiction or for a 
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particular transaction (which could cross multiple jurisdictions) could encourage compliance with 
AML processes and ethical decision-making. Any failures or limitations in the regulatory 
environment, however, will mitigate its effectiveness by limiting deterrence efforts or affecting 
individuals’ or firms’ ability to comply. The nature of the organisation in which a legal 
professional works (e.g. size; complexity; nature of their business and clients; extent 
(local/global) of their reach; structure; division of responsibility, authority and accountability; 
compliance processes and management; internal oversight processes and procedures; 
autonomy of individuals) will influence the types of decisions that lawyers have to take and the 
choices they make. A personal or family relationship, or some form of ‘broker’ to the 
relationship, can cause a legal professional to make decisions about a client or transaction that 




Future research/analysis recommendations:  
- Map the points of decision-making for legal professionals, in relation to their clients, the 
transactions they are involved in and the services they provide, in different organisational 
and regulatory contexts. 
- Further analysis of the nature of the various situational contexts summarised in figure 9.1, 






Recommendations for policy and practice: a combination of approaches 
The variation in the nature of legal professionals’ involvement in the facilitation of money 
laundering, and the challenges and limitations inherent in individual strategies, mean that there 
cannot be a single approach to controlling it. For example, difficulties in detection, investigation 
and prosecution and the unsuitability of deterrence approaches for those who do not make an 
active choice to facilitate laundering mean that, on its own, the enforcement of criminal laws and 
regulations would be insufficient. On the other hand, methods to assist lawyers wishing to 
comply would be ineffective for those actively seeking to launder others’ criminal proceeds.  
 
Cooperative strategies to encourage compliance with AML regulations, 1  and with the 
professional standards, rules and codes of conducts of the legal profession more broadly, are 
an important element. These should provide the means to comply, take account of variation in 
the capacity to comply, and foster the desire to comply. Deterrence strategies should aim for 
effective and proportionate detection, investigation, prosecution and sanctioning and 
increasing perceptions amongst the profession of the likely implications of misconduct.  
 
The research highlights the roles of opportunity/vulnerability structures and decision-
making in the facilitation of money laundering, as discussed above. Therefore, alongside 
compliance and deterrence strategies, the combined approach should include: (i) identifying 
and inhibiting structural factors that provide opportunities for legal professionals to facilitate 
money laundering or make them vulnerable to being exploited for laundering purposes and (ii) 
understanding the points of decision-making for legal professionals that can lead to their 
involvement in the facilitation of money laundering and developing strategies for influencing 
the choices made at these points.  
 
Chapter 9 of Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime provides a comprehensive overview and 
explanation of these strategies (directed primarily at the UK context, but with principles that are 




Lawyers and the Proceeds of Crime: The Facilitation of Money  
Laundering and its Control by Katie Benson is available here.  
																																																								
1 E.g. in the UK the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the 
Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 
